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.................. ~ .................. BENNETTL.GERSHMAN* 
The Prosecutor as a 
"Minister of Justice" 
8 
T hese are heady times for prosecutors. Gone are the days when the Supreme 
Court every other week, it seemed, 
would invoke a new due process 
right for criminal defendants; when 
prosecutors would frantically 
prepare for strange new hearings 
labeled "Mapp", "Huntley", and 
"Wade"; would be embroiled in sen-
sational, political trials-Harlem 6; 
Chicago 7; Harrisburg 8; Boston 5; 
Panther 21-only to be rebuked by 
defense counsel, the press, the 
public, and juries. Prosecutors were 
often on the defensive in those days. 
Times have changed. Today, 
prosecutors are on top of the world. 
Their powers are enormous, and 
constantly reinforced by sym-
pathetic legislatures and courts. The 
"awful instruments of the criminal 
law," as Justice Frankfurter describ-
ed the system,1 are today sup-
plemented with broad new crimes,2 
easier proof requirements,3 heavier 
sentencing laws, 4 and an extremely 
cooperative judiciary, from district 
and state judges, to the highest 
Court in the land. 
White Plains 
Indeed, Supreme Court wat-
chers, and 1 am one of them, 
carefully analyze the oracles from 
our Nation's legal equivalent of Mt. 
Olympus, and try to discern trends. 
Some trends are easy to decipher, 
such as the Death of the Fourth 
Amendment; the continuing drift 
from adjudicative fair play, sym-
* The author is an Adjunct Professor of Law 
at Pace University School of Law, and prac-
tices law in White Plains, New York. He was 
a prosecutor for ten years in the offices of 
Frank S. Hogan and Maurice H. Nadjari, and 
has written extensively about prosecutorial 
and police conduct. 
1 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 
343 (1943). 
2 See, e,g. 18 U.S.c, §§. 1961 et. seq. 
(Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act); 
18 U,S,c, § 1952 (A) (murder for hire); 18 
U,S,c, § 1952 (B) (commission of violent 
crimes in aid of racketeering activity), 
3 See 18 U,S,c, § 1623 (lessening proof re-
quirements in perjury prosecutions); 
Fed,R.Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) (l~ssening proof re-
quirements in conspiracy prosecutions, as in-
terpreted in Bourjaily v. United States, 107 
S,Ct, 2775 (1987), 
4 See 21 U,S.c, § 841 (b)(l) (increasing 
penalties for drug trafficking); 18 U.S,C. § 
924 (c) (imposing mandatory penalty for use 
of firearms during commission of violent 
crime). 
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bolized by the Due Process Revolu-
tion of the Nineteen-Sixties, to 
crime control, epitomized by what I 
have termed the Counter-
Revolution of Harmless Error;5 and 
the increasing availability and use of 
draconian forms of punishment, 
whether labeled preventive deten-
tion,6 consecutive jail sentences for 
overlapping criminal acts,7 and 
more and more executions.s 
Another trend, more subtle, 
perhaps, has been a change in the 
role of the prosecutor. Twenty-five 
years ago, in one of the great cases 
of this or any generation - Brady 
v. Maryland9 - the Supreme Court 
could write this about the pro-
secutor's duty: "Society wins not 
only when the gUilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair; our 
system of the administration of 
justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly."IO 
This statement was a kind of 
banner under which enthusiastic 
young men and women began legal 
careers in prosecutors offices, par-
ticularly in the office of New York 
County District Attorney Frank S. 
Hogan. Indeed, the cover story of 
one issue of the New York Times 
Magazine profiled that office, under 
the title: "Hogan's Office Is a Kind 
of Ministry of Justice."l1 For a long 
time it has been an accepted part of 
the conventional legal wisdom, 
translated into one of the principal 
Standards of Criminal Justice of the 
American Bar Association, that it is 
the duty of the prosecutor "to seek 
justice, not merely to convict."12 
There are, however, serious 
practical and conceptual difficulties 
in squaring the prosecutor's func-
tion with that of a "l\Ilinister of 
Justice." The concept was seriously 
eroded in two important decisions 
of the Supreme Court -Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire13 and Gerstein v. 
Pugh14-in which the Court 
recognized that it is realistically im-
possible for a prosecutor to play the 
dual roles of vigorous advocate and 
protector of public justice. In 
Coolidge, the Court said that the 
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL MAY 1988 
prosecutor is too heavily involved 
in the "competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime" to pass on the suf-
ficiency of a search warrant in a case 
being investigated under his super-
vision. Only a judge is neutral and 
impartial enough to do so. And in 
Gerstein, the Court held that an in-
formation drafted by a prosecutor is 
not "judicial" enough to provide an 
objective guarantee of probable 
cause comparable to that furnished 
by a grand jury, because the pro-
secutor is inherently partisan, while 
the grand jury is an arm of the 
court. 
Futhermore, anybody who has 
carefully followed recent 
developments in criminal justice, 
and particularly the Surpreme 
Court's treatment of prosecutorial 
behavior, must view such references 
to the prosecutor's purported justice 
function with considerable skep-
5 Gershman, "The Harmless Error Rule: 
Overlooking Violations of Constitutional 
Rights," 14 West.B.J. 3 (1987). 
6 United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 
(1987) (upholding 18 U.S.c. § 3142 (e) of Bail 
Reform Act of 1984). 
7 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 
(1981); United States v. Blocker, 802 F.2d 
1102 (9th Cir. 1986). 
S See "Rise in Executions Widening Debate," 
N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, p. 30. In Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987), the 
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the 
death penalty over claims that the penalty 
was imposed disproportionately against 
racial minorities. This decision may have in-
volved the last major challenge to the death 
penalty as violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription against "cruel and 
unusual punishments." 
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
10 ld. at 87. 
11 Mayer, "Hogan's Office is a kind of 
Ministry of Justice," N. Y. Times Magazine, 
July 23, 1967, p. 7. 
12 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, 
3-1.1(c) (1980). 
13 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
14 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
9 
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ticism. This is not to suggest that 
prosecutors by and large behave un-
fairly. They do not. However, the 
prosecutor's role is not that of a 
justice-giver, but of an advocate, a 
"Champion of the People," in the 
same way that defense counsel's role 
is not a defender of abstract justice, 
but, rather, a Champion of the 
Defendant. Frequent ceremonial 
language about the prosecutor's 
quasi-judicial function15 is not only 
misleading, but may be detrimental. 
It places the prosecutor in an 
untenable conflict, forcing him con-
stantly to walk a tightrope, and it 
invites the judiciary to display a 
kind of obeisance towards the pro-
secutor, suggesting that he or she 
stands above the fray, omnipotent 
and infallible. 
To be sure, the prosecutor has a 
fundamental commitment to fair 
dealing, not foul play.16 The respect, 
and success, of any prosecutor's of-
fice depends on a high degree of 
skill, good judgment, and fairness. 
If the prosecutor plays fairly and by 
the rules, justice probably will work 
itself out under our system of adver-
sarial testing. However, to the ex-
tent that some courts, particularly 
the Supreme Court, continue to 
evince a consistent and unyielding 
philosophy of judicial per-
missiveness in the face of pro-
secutorial excesses, many pro-
secutors will get the wrong message, 
namely, that misconduct pays.17 
And to the extent that bar 
disciplinary committees wink at 
prosecutorial excesses, the message 
is reinforced.18 
Clearly, prosecutors have legal 
and ethical obligations different 
from their defense counterparts. 
Prosecutors are guided by stricter 
rules, many of which are embodied 
in the constitution. Moreover, in 
contrast to defense counsel, pro-
secutors wield tremendous power 
and tremendous discretion. The jux-
taposition of such power and discre-
tion can be dangerous, especially if 
courts display restraint, passivity, 
and even withdrawal in the face of 
10 
prosecutorial misbehavior. Indeed, 
such combination can be lethal. For 
example, in the recent capital case of 
Darden v. Wainwright,19 the pro-
secutor, among other things, 
characterized the defendant as an 
"animal;" told the jury that the only 
guarantee against his future crimes 
would be to execute him; that he 
should have "a leash on him;" and 
that he should have "his face blown 
away by a shotgun." Darden's trial 
was "not perfect," said the Supreme 
Court in upholding his conviction 
and death sentence. "Few are." "But 
neither was it fundamentally 
unfair. "19. 
Obviously, we can never know 
to what extent the jury in finding 
guilt and imposing death, was in-
fluenced by the prosecutor's 
outrageous remarks. Was Darden 
trea ted unfairly? The answer 
depends, in part, on where one sits. 
One of the major problems with the 
Supreme Court's prosecutorial 
jurisprudence - and that of ap-
pellate courts generally - is that 
these courts look at trial pro-
ceedings retrospectively, and can 
only guess, quantitatively or 
qualitatively, at the prejudicial im-
pact of such misconduct, or its in-
fluence on the fairness of the trial.20 
To be sure, the Supreme Court 
has not tolerated every form of pro-
secutorial misconduct. In one case 
- Batson v. Kentucky21 - the 
Court at long last outlawed the per-
nicious prosecutorial practice of 
peremptorily challenging minority 
jurors from jury service. Bt;ltson, as 
well as Vasquez v. Hillery,22 which 
dealt with grand jury discrimina-
tion, are clearly long overdue and 
are to be applauded. However, they 
involve equal protection concerns to 
which the Court has displayed far 
greater sensitivity than to due pro-
cess concerns. Indeed, virtually 
every important decision of the 
Supreme Court over the past several 
terms addressing the prosecutor's 
conduct involved a lower court 
judgment - state or federal -
which had sustained the defendant's 
claim of improper prosecutorial 
behavior. In virtually every case, 
the Supreme Court reversed. It also 
should be noted that among the 
dozens of summary reversals by the 
Court - done without briefs or oral 
argument - well over 90% were 
decided in the prosecutor's favor. 23 
Any lingering notion that the 
prosecutor is obligated to dispense 
justice has been dispelled by recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court. For 
example, the increasingly expansive 
use of the harmless error doctrine is 
one of the principal themes in the 
Court's treatment of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Thus, in United States 
v. Mechanik,24 the Court for the 
first time held that prosecutorial 
misconduct in the grand jury, 
reviewed on appeal following a con-
viction, could be harmless error. 
Similarly. in United States v. Lane,25 
the Court held for the first time that 
improper conduct in mischarging 
crimes, reviewed on appeal follow-
ing a conviction, could be harmless 
error. Further, in United States v. 
Hasting,26 the Court held that lower 
15 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 
(1985), quoting Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
16 Berger v. United States, supra. 
17 See Rose v. Clark, 106 Sup.Ct. 3101, 3112 
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also 
Gershman, "Why Prosecutors Misbehave," 
22 Crim. L. Bull. 131 (1986). 
18 Bar Committees rarely impose discipline 
on offending prosecutors. But see In re Rook, 
276 Ore. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976) (miscon-
duct in plea bargaining). It is Virtually 
unheard of for disciplinary sanctions to be 
imposed for misconduct in the courtroom. 
19 106 Sup.Ct. 2464, 2471-73 (1986). 
19> On March 15, 1988, Willie Darden was 
executed in Florida's electric chair. N. Y. 
Times, March 16, 1988, p. A15. 
20 See R. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF 
HARMLESS ERROR (1969); Note, "Pro-
secutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political In-
fluence" 34 Ind. L. J. 477, 486 (1959). 
21 106 S.O. 1712 (1986). 
22 106 S.O. 617 (1986). 
23 See United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 
453,458 (1985) (dissenting opinion). 
24 475 U.S. 66 (1986). 
25 474 U.S. 438 (1986). 
26 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
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federal courts could not use their 
supervisory powers to discipline er-
rant prosecutors who had con-
sistently violated that circuit's rules. 
These courts were ordered to apply 
the harmless error test instead. 
It is in the area of nondisclosure 
of exculpatory evidence, however, 
that the Supreme Court has 
rendered most meaningless notions 
of fundamental fairness and con-
stitutional protections afforded 
criminal defendants. This is the one 
area above all else that depends on 
the integrity and good faith of the 
prosecutor. If the prosecutor hides 
evidence, it . will probably never be 
known. Moreover, as an advocate, 
the prosecutor, if candid, will con-
cede that his or her inclination is not 
to disclose. By way of rough 
analogy, we do not enjoy paying 
taxes. Since the government's 
auditing powers are severly limited, 
the tax system depends largely on 
the integrity of the individual tax-
payer. Many evaders are not ap-
prehended. But if a tax cheat is 
caught, the chances are good that 
the courts will impose severe sanc-
tions, mostly for deterrent pur-
poses. 
So, it seems, should it be with 
prosecu torial suppression of 
evidence. But in this one area, 
where the prosecutor's fairness is so 
dramatically put to the test, the 
Supreme Court has continued to 
default. First, according to the 
Court, the prosecutor's good or bad 
faith in secreting evidence is irrele-
vant. 27 But surely if one seeks to 
deter prosecutors from hiding ex-
culpatory evidence, willful viola-
tions should be severely punished. 
Not so, according to the Court. The 
hidden evidence has to be 
"material," that is, as the' Court 
wrote recently· in United States v. 
Bagley,28 a case involving a pro-
secutor's false representations to 
defense counsel about monetary in-
ducements to government 
witnesses, it has to be shown that 
but for the nondisclosure, the ver-
dict would have been different. 
12 
Examples of this quagmire 
spawned by the Court are 
numerous. In Smith v. Phillips,29 the 
prosecutor suppressed information 
that a juror in a murder trial had 
sought employment with the same 
prosecutor's office. The Supreme 
Court reversed the Second Circuit, 
which had granted the habeas cor-
pus petition. The Court said first, 
that there was no showing of actual 
bias, nor, secondly, any showing 
that the defendant was prejudiced 
by the nondisclosure. Ethical stan-
dards may be overlooked, said 
Justice Rehnquist for the majority, 
because the "touchstone of due pro-
cess analysis is the fairness of the 
trial, not the culpability of the pro-
secutor." But, quaere, how does one 
demonstrate prejudice if the juror 
swears: "I was not prejudiced"? 
Similarly, in United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal,30 the prosecutor 
ordered the deportation of illegal-
alien eyewitnesses to the defendant's 
crime before they could be inter-
viewed by defense counsel. The 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit, which had reversed the con-
viction. The prompt deportation of 
illegal-aliens is an overriding duty of 
the Executive Branch, the Court 
said, to which the Court will defer 
absent a plausible showing that the 
lost evidence would be material and 
favorable to the defense. Of course, 
as the dissent correctly pointed out, 
showing the importance of evidence 
without an opportunity to examine 
that evidence can be exceedingly dif-
ficult. And in California v. 
Trombetta,31 the Court reversed the 
state court which had reversed the 
defendant's intoxicated driving con-
viction because the prosecutor had 
failed to preserve as evidence the 
contents of a breathilyzer test. The 
evidence was not sufficiently 
material, said the Court. To be 
material, a defendant is required to 
show that the evidence possessed an 
exculpatory quality that was ap-
parent before the evidence was 
destroyed, and was of such nature 
that the defendant would be unable 
to obtain comparable evidence. 
Again, how does a defendant show 
the importance of evidence that is 
no longer available? 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's 
undue deference to the prosecutor, 
as noted above, can result in 
wholesale abdication of traditional 
judicial functions. With due respect 
to the judiciary, the prosecutor is 
the most dominant and powerful of-
ficial in the criminal justice system. 
The prosecutor runs the show. The 
prosecutor decides whether or not 
to bring criminal charges; who to 
charge; what charges to bring; 
whether a defendant will stand trial, 
plead guilty, or be conferred with 
immunity. The prosecutor even 
possesses broad sentencing powers, 
as the New York Court of Appeals' 
decision in People v. Farrar il-
lustrates.32 The prosecutor enjoys 
virtual independence. He has no 
superiors. He cannot be compelled 
to bring charges or to terminate 
them. Moreover, in using these vast 
powers, the prosecutor is presumed 
to act in good faith. The Supreme 
Court wrote a few months ago in a 
case involving the use of a private 
prosecutor: "Between the private 
life of the citizen and the public 
glare of criminal accusation stands 
the prosecutor, with the power to 
employ the full machinery of the 
state in scrutinizing any given in-
dividual. "33 And, one might add, to 
stigmatize that person for life. To be 
sure, the prosecutor's vast charging 
discretion is contrained by a few 
modest doctrines: the prosecutor 
Continued on Page 63 
27 United States v, Agurs, 427 U.S, 97 
(1976); Giglio v, United States, 405 U.S, 150 
(1972), 
28 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), 
29 455 U,S, 209 (1982), 
30 458 U,S, 858 (1982), 
31 467 U,S, 479 (1984), 
32 52 N,Y,2d 304, 419 N,E,2d 864, 437 
N,Y,S,2d 961. (1981), 
33 Young v, United States ex reI. Vuitton et 
Fils S,A" 107 $,Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987). 
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The Prosecutor as a 
"Minister of Justice" 
Continued from Page 12 
must not be unfairly selective, vin-
dictive, or demagogic in using his 
charging powers. These doctrines, 
however, are rarely invoked, and 
hardly ever successful. 
No area of criminal justice is 
more complex and controversial 
than that of the prosecutor's discre-
tion, particularly as it relates to 
charging, plea bargaining, dismiss-
ing, and granting immunity. It is 
here, in my judgment, that the 
courts should exercise more 
vigilance and control. Yet here, 
more than any other area, the courts 
have withdrawn more than ever. 34 
Several recent cases illustrate the in-
effectiveness of doctrine as it relates 
to the prosecutor's discretion. In 
Wayte v. United States,35 for exam-
ple, the defendant, a vocal oppo-
nent of the Selective Service system, 
was one of a handful of non-
registrants who was prosecuted, out 
of nearly a million non-vocal non-
registrants. Wayte made a colorable 
showing .that he was impermissibly 
targeted for prosecution based on 
his exercise of First Amendment 
rights. He sought to discover infor-
mation in the prosecutor's files. 
When the prosecutor resisted, the 
district court dismissed the indict-
ment. The Supreme Court treated 
the case not as a discovery problem. 
The Court found that there was no 
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL MAY 1988 
showing that the defendant was 
selected "because of his protest ac-
tivities," a showing of prosecutorial 
motivation that seems almost im-
possible to prove. Given the 
presumption of prosecutorial good 
faith, the prosecutor's expertise, and 
the prosecutor's law enforcement 
plans and priorities, matters which 
are ill-suited to judicial review, said 
the Court, there would be no in-
terference with the prosecutor's 
discretion, even in this obvious in-
stance of a prima facie case of selec-
tive prosecution. 
Unfair selectivity is matched by 
prosecutorial retaliation in the form 
of increased charges after defen-
dants raise statutory or constitu-
tional claims. Prosecutors, 
however, may not be vindictive in 
response to a defendant's exercise of 
rights. Proving prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness, however, is another mat-
ter. The courts have indulged the 
prosecutor in this area as well. 
Thus, prosecutorial retaliation by 
increasing charges after a plea offer 
is refused is not legally vindictive, 
said the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Goodwin,36 reaffirming 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,37 even 
though such tactics may 
demonstrate actual vindictiveness. 
The concerns are purely pragmatic. 
Prosecutors need this leverage to 
run the system. If prosecutors could 
not threaten defendants by "upping 
the ante;" they would obtain fewer 
pleas. Further, in virtually every 
pretrial context in which pro-
secutors have increased charges 
after defendants have exercised 
rights, courts uniformly have found 
no vindictiveness. This can result in 
some patently unfair decisions. In 
one recent New York case,38 the pro-
secutor charged the defendant with 
perjury after his motion to suppress 
evidence was granted. The hearing 
court found that the defendant was 
a credible witness, and the police 
witnesses were not. This is a blatant 
instance of prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness, or alternatively, of pro-
secutorial bad faith, particularly 
after a judge already had made a 
credibility determination in the 
defendant's favor. 
Prosecutorial behavior in plea 
bargaining is standardless and often 
highly coercive. A plea bargain is a 
constitutional contract. The pro-
secutor must keep his promise. 
However, the prosecutor's decisions 
usually are deferred to by the 
Courts, and the prosecutor's inter-
pretation of the bargain usually con-
trols. A good example of this is 
Ricketts v. Adamson,39 decided by 
the Supreme Court last June. The 
case arose out of the murder of 
Arizona newspaper reporter Don 
Bolles. The prosecutor and Adam-
son agreed that Adamson would 
testify fully and completely in 
63 
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must not be unfairly selective, vin-
dictive, or demagogic in using his
charging powers. These doctrines,
however, are rarely invoked, and
hardly ever successful.
No area of criminal justice is
more complex and controversial
than that of the prosecutor's discre-
tion, particularly as it relates to
charging, plea bargaining, dismiss-
ing, and granting immunity. It is
here, in my judgment, that the
courts should exercise more
vigilance and control. Yet here,
more than any other area, the courts
have withdrawn more than ever.3 4
Several recent cases illustrate the in-
effectiveness of doctrine as it relates
to the prosecutor's discretion. In
Wayte v. United States,35 for exam-
ple, the defendant, a vocal oppo-
nent of the Selective Service system,
was one of a handful of non-
registrants who was prosecuted, out
of nearly a million non-vocal non-
registrants. Wayte made a colorable
showing that he was impermissibly
targeted for prosecution based on
his exercise of First Amendment
rights. He sought to discover infor-
mation in the prosecutor's files.
When the prosecutor resisted, the
district court dismissed the indict-
ment. The Supreme Court treated
the case not as a discovery problem.
The Court found that there was no
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showing that the defendant was
selected "because of his protest ac-
tivities," a showing of prosecutorial
motivation that seems almost im-
possible to prove. Given the
presumption of prosecutorial good
faith, the prosecutor's expertise, and
the prosecutor's law enforcement
plans and priorities, matters which
are ill-suited to judicial review, said
the Court, there would be no in-
terference with the prosecutor's
discretion, even in this obvious in-
stance of a prima facie case of selec-
tive prosecution.
Unfair selectivity is matched by
prosecutorial retaliation in the form
of increased charges after defen-
dants raise statutory or constitu-
tional claims. Prosecutors,
however, may not be vindictive in
response to a defendant's exercise of
rights. Proving prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness, however, is another mat-
ter. The courts have indulged the
prosecutor in this area as well.
Thus, prosecutorial retaliation by
increasing charges after a plea offer
is refused is not legally vindictive,
said the Supreme Court in United
States v. Goodwin,36 reaffirming
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,17 even
though such tactics may
demonstrate actual vindictiveness.
The concerns are purely pragmatic.
Prosecutors need this leverage to
run the system. If prosecutors could
not threaten defendants by "upping
the ante," they would obtain fewer
pleas. Further, in virtually every
pretrial context in which pro-
secutors have increased charges
after defendants have exercised
rights, courts uniformly have found
no vindictiveness. This can result in
some patently unfair decisions. In
one recent New York case,38 the pro-
secutor charged the defendant with
perjury after his motion to suppress
evidence was granted. The hearing
court found that the defendant was
a credible witness, and the police
witnesses were not. This is a blatant
instance of prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness, or alternatively, of pro-
secutorial bad faith, particularly
after a judge already had made a
credibility determination in the
defendant's favor.
Prosecutorial behavior in plea
bargaining is standardless and often
highly coercive. A plea bargain is a
constitutional contract. The pro-
secutor must keep his promise.
However, the prosecutor's decisions
usually are deferred to by the
Courts, and the prosecutor's inter-
pretation of the bargain usually con-
trols. A good example of this is
Ricketts v. Adamson,3 9 decided by
the Supreme Court last June. The
case arose out of the murder of
Arizona newspaper reporter Don
Bolles. The prosecutor and Adam-
son agreed that Adamson would
testify fully and completely in
return for a plea to a reduced
murder charge and a reduced
sentence. Adamson testified at the
murder trial of two other co-
defendants and was sentenced. All
told, Adamson made 14 court ap-
pearances in 5 separate cases - 31
days of testimony and over 200 in-
terview sessions with the prosecutor
- but balked at testifying at a
retrial after the above murder con-
victions were reversed. He claimed
that his plea agreement, reasonably
construed, did not require such ad-
ditional testimony. The prosecutor
disagreed, claimed that Adamson
breached his agreement, and not-
withstanding Adamson's willingness
to accede to the prosecutor's inter-
pretation, nonetheless indicted and
convicted Adamson of first degree
murder, and obtained a death
sentence. A majority of the Court
upheld the prosecutor's interpreta-
tion of the agreement, and found
there was no double jeopardy bar to
Adamson's conviction. The four
dissenting Justices, on the other
hand, said that Adamson had not
breached, that there was a
reasonable basis for his interpreta-
tion, and that the matter should
have been submitted to the courts
for resolution. Overzealousness
may be an appropriate characteriza-
tion of the prosecutor's conduct
here. He behaved more like an
"Avenging Angel" than a "Minister
of Justice."
Although prosecutors may need
"leverage" in plea bargaining, they
do not need leverage when seeking a
defendant's agreement to release the
police or municipality from civil
liability following an arrest, and us-
ing the dismissal of charges as a
weapon to compel such agreement.
In Newton v. Rumery,40 the First
Circuit, as had several other cir-
cuits, found such release-dismissal
agreements invalid as contravening
public policy. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the agreement
was voluntarily and knowingly
entered into, as in the case of plea
bargains. But as the dissent pointed
out, the release-dismissal agreement
is inherently coercive and unfair,
there being no mutuality of advan-
tage, as there is in plea bargaining.
Moreover, there is a conflict of in-
terest between the prosecutor's in-
terest in furthering legitimate law
enforcement objectives, and at the
same time protecting the town,
police, or other public officials,
from civil liability.
Finally, as noted above, the
standards applied by the courts to
prosecutors often are unrealistic.
Clearly, the search for a pro-
secutorial mens rea, or guilty mind,
is hazardous at best. Prosecutors do
not confess their misdeeds, and
presumptions are rarely invoked.
Thus, in Oregon v. Kennedy,41 a
case in which a prosecutor's miscon-
duct provoked the defendant to ask
for a mistrial, the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether retrial
should be barred on double jeopar-
dy grounds. Several courts, in-
cluding some New York courts,
looked to the seriousness of the
misconduct in deciding whether to
bar retrial.42 The Supreme Court,
however, adopted the most restric-
tive approach possible, requiring
proof that the prosecutor's specific
intention was to goad the defendant
into seeking a mistrial, rather than
prejudicing the defendant generally.
Proving such specific intent, said the
four dissenting justices, is "almost
inconceivable. 43
For some prosecutors, the temp-
tation to cross over the allowable
ethical line often must be irresisti-
ble, particularly because miscon-
duct frequently creates distinct ad-
vantages to prosecutors in helping
to win their case. It takes a steadfast
effort on the part of prosecutors to
maintain high moral and profes-
sional standards necessary to avoid
such temptations. Regrettably,
many courts, notably the Supreme
Court, have provided few incentives
to prosecutors to avoid misconduct.
As with punishment generally,
deterring misconduct requires the
imposition of realistic sanctions.
Such sanctions are either nonexis-
tent or not used. Prosecutors are
generally immune from civil liabili-
ty.44 Imposition of discipline by bar
committees is virtually unheard of.45
Contempt rulings by trial judges are
rare. 46 Appellate reversals may
punish society more than the pro-
secutor. 47 And although appellate
courts occasionally issue stinging
rebukes, the decisions rarely if ever
identify the offending prosecutor by
name. Perhaps if the prosecutor
were forced to appear before the ap-
pellate tribunal to defend his or her
conduct, the incidence of courtroom
misconduct might diminish.
Although not a Minister of
Justice, the prosecutor's role may
well be the most exacting of any
public official. But by the same
token, the public has a right to re-
quire of that official the highest
measure of responsibility, profes-
sionalism, and integrity. Pro-
secutors who use their prodigious
powers gracefully and fairly are no
less effective as Champions of the
People, and will be far worthier of
respect and admiration. Courts and
bar associations have to send out
better messages, and provide
stronger incentives for prosecutors
to behave fairly.
34 See A. Goldstein, THE PASSIVE
JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRE-
TION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
35 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
36 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
37 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
38 People v. Stephens, 122 A.D.2d 608, 505
N.Y.S.2d 393 (4th Dept. 1986).
39 107 S.Ct. 2680 (1987).
40 107 S.Ct. 1187 (1987).
41 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
' See People v. Cavallerio, 104 Misc.2d 436,
428 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1980). See also Petrucelli
v. Smith, 544 F.Supp. 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
43 456 U.S. at 688.
44 Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
45 See B. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 13.6 (1985).
46 See B. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 13,3 (1985).
47 See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d
1173, 1182-86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982).
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